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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
1 lie I ) tali Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code - Viin 
§78-2a 3(2)0(19? >< >). " •-. <> ' '..;'.. '.'" - '^ • • •' 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES 
Issue 1. The pertinent statutory provisions governing the award of damages for a 
stiln s bicacli .is occum t - t ase, appeal ,il I Ulli, "HJI: li'ii ^ ," {•!• ' ' ' "5 
(1999). (Seti verbatim npellant's Addendum 1). 
Issue 2. The pertinent statutory provisions governing the propriety of awarding 
prejudgment interest appear at (Itah Code Ann §:: o c n "~f .'•••• v e r b a t i m as 
A^-A-* Interest rates - Contracted rate - Legal i ate. 
i i; The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any 
rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, 
or chose in action that is the subject of their contract 
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different 
rate of interest, the legal rate of interest for the loan or 
forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action shall be 
10% per annum. 
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in ari\ way 
to affect any penalty or interest charge that by law applies to 
delinquent or other taxes or to any contract or obligations made 
before May 14, 1981 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
MATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT. 
D e f e n d a n t s h a v e a p p e a l e d It le trial c o m :..:, - • .: -* 
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after a bench trial, awarding Plaintiff, Keith M. Jonsson, the sum of $46,400, plus 
prejudgment interest in the amount of $13,533, and costs in the amount of $600, for a total 
Judgment of $60,533 plus post judgment interest. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
1. On March 4, 1996, Plaintiff Keith Jonsson purchased from Defendants, a 
generator, electrical equipment and a feed truck (R. 353, at p. 12:2-11), (Plaintiffs Exhibit 
i). 
2. Defendant Reed Bromley agreed with Plaintiff Keith Jonsson, that Mr. Jonsson 
could leave the generator and electrical equipment at the Bromley Farm in order to allow 
that Mr. Bromley's electrical power remain connected to egg processing equipment and 
chicken sheds, so Bromley could sell the egg processing equipment; and also, to avoid 
turning off the electrical power to a residence owned by Reed Bromley's father (R. 302 at 
p. 23:22-25, p. 24:1-20). 
3. In October of 1996, Defendant Reed Bromley falsely represented to Plaintiff Keith 
Jonsson that the generator and switching unit had been taken to Salt Lake City to be semced 
(R. 272, Memorandum Decision). 
4. Defendant Reed Bromley had actually sold the generator and switching equipment 
to a third party; and after Plaintiff Keith Jonsson had discovered that Defendant Reed 
Bromley had sold the equipment, Reed Bromley represented to Mr. Jonsson that if Mr. 
Jonsson would find out the replacement cost of the generator and switching equipment, he, 
Reed Bromley would replace such equipment that he had admitted to Mr. Jonsson, he had 
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wrongfully sold(R. 353 at p. 82:15-25, at p. 83, p. 1-2, R. 353 at p. 147:23-24, R. 353 at p. 
149:20-25). 
5. Plaintiff Keith Jonsson determined that the replacement value of the generator and 
switching equipment would be approximately Thirty-Six Thousand ($36,000) to Forty-Six 
Thousand ($46,000) Dollars, and relayed this information to Defendant Bromley, who 
thereafter refused to talk to Keith Jonsson (R. 353 at p. 150:5-7). 
6. Defendant Reed Bromley sold the equipment he had previously sold to Plaintiff 
Keith Jonsson in order to protect real property that his company owned, which subsequently 
sold for 2.2 Million Dollars (R. 353 at pages 150, 151:1-21). 
7. Richard Mitchell, an electrician with a degree in math and physics, who had been 
engaged in the business of an electrician since 1994, and had continuously provided 
maintenance services to Defendant Bromley Farms for approximately 30 years, was familiar 
with the generator. He was employed by Plaintiff Keith Jonsson to disconnect and move the 
generator (R. 353 at pages 19-21). 
8. Richard Mitchell testified that the generator had a value of between Twenty-Three 
or Twenty-Four Thousand ($23,000 through $24,000) Dollars; and that the switching 
equipment had a value of Six to Eight Thousand ($6,000 through $8,000) Dollars (R. 353 
at p. 28). 
9. Plaintiff Keith Jonsson paid Richard Mitchell Twenty-Five Hundred ($2,500) 
Dollars to disconnect and move the switching equipment (R. 353 at p. 78:3-15). 
10. Jim Yates, who had been in the business of selling equipment for approximately 
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30 years, testified that the generator was worth between Twenty-Five and Thirty-Five 
Thousand ($25,000 through $35,000) Dollars, based on the price of a new generator and the 
hours that the subject generator had on it. (R. 353 at p. 117:16-23). 
11. Mr. Yates testified that he did not know what the switching equipment was worth 
(R. 353 at p. 113). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT I: The trial court made findings as to Plaintiffs damages. The trial 
court utilized U.C.A. §§ 70A-2-711, 713 and 715 (1999), as the basis for its measure of 
damages and made findings that Plaintiff was entitled to a return of his purchase price, (70 A-
2-711), the market value of the equipment (70A-2-713) and incidental damages (70A-2-715). 
The trial court's findings as to the foregoing damages were supported by the evidence, and 
were proper under the requirements of the applicable Uniform Commercial Code Sections. 
ARGUMENT II: The trial court's findings as to the market value of the generator and 
switching equipment was determined in accordance with fixed "rules of evidence and 
appropriate standards of value," which entitled Plaintiff to prejudgment interest. Further, the 
award of prejudgment interest in accordance with the policy considerations, which are the 
basis for an award of prejudgment interest, awarded Plaintiff damages for the delay in the 
money owed to him and prevented the Defendants from being benefited by failing to pay the 
money that they knew was owed to Plaintiff in November of 1996. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CALCULATED THE PLAINTIFF'S 
DAMAGES 
Appellants argue that the trial court miscalculated the damages under U C A § § 70A-2-711, 
713, 715 Such is not the case U C A § 70A-2-711(1) (b) provides as follows 
(1) Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiate or the buyer 
rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance then with respect to 
any goods involved, an with respect to the whole if the breach goes to 
the whole contract (Section 70A-2-612), the buyer may cancel and 
whether or not he has done so may in addition to recovering so much 
of the price as has been paid (emphasis added) 
(b) recover damages for nondelivery as provided in this 
chapter (Section 70A-2-713) 
U C A § 70A-2-713(l) provides as follows 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this chapter with respect to proof 
of market price (Section 70A-2-723), the measure of damages for 
nondelivery or repudiation by the seller is the difference between the 
market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach and the 
contract price together with any incidental and consequential damages 
provided in this chapter (Section 70A-2-715), but less expenses saved 
in consequence of the seller's breach 
U C A § 70A-2-715 (1) provides as follows 
(1) Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include 
expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and 
care and custody of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially 
reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in connection with 
effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to the delay 
or other breach 
The trial court applying the above provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code stated in it's 
Memorandum Decision 
The Code specifically provides for compensatory remedies for 
aggrieved buyers in U C A § 70A-2-711(1) "[T]he buyer may.../// 
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addition to recovering so much of the price as has been paid. . . (b) 
recover damages for nondelivery as provided in this chapter (Section 
70A-2-713)" 
Utah Code Annotated § 70A-2-713 then provides for expectational 
damages in the event of a seller's breach 
Subject to the provisions of this chapter with respect to proof of 
market price (section 70A-2-723), the measure of damages for 
nondelivery or repudiated by the seller is the difference between the 
market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach and the 
contract price together with any incidental and consequential 
damages provided in this chapter (Section 70A-2-715), but less 
expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach 
Incidental damages, pursuant to UC A § 70A-2-715(l) "include 
expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation 
and care and custody of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially 
reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in connection with 
effecting cover and any reasonable expense incident to the delay or 
other breach" 
According to the UCC, Mr Jonsson is entitled to recover (1) the 
amount he paid Defendants under the contract for the goods he did 
not receive, (2) the difference between the market and contract prices 
for the goods, and (3) incidental damages he has incurred as a result 
of his performance under the breached contract (Memorandum 
Decision, R 269-270) 
The trial court, according to the exact wording of the statute, awarded Plaintiff Keith Jonsson 
the $5,900 that he had paid to Defendants for the purchase of the generator and switching equipment 
and calculated the Judgment as follows 
Accordingly, Plaintiff Keith Jonsson is entitled to a judgment 
against the Defendants, Reed Bromley and Utah Valley Egg & 
Poultry, Inc, jointly and severally in the amount of Forty-Six 
Thousand Four Hundred ($46,400) Dollars (which is the total of 
$5,900 (amount paid less value of feed truck) + $38,000 (value of 
generator and switching unit) + $2,500 (sum paid to Richard 
Mitchell), together with interest thereon at the legal rate of 10% per 
annum from November 14, 1996 through the present, pursuant to 
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Section 15-l-(2) Utah Code Annotated ($13,533), together with 
Plaintiffs costs in the amount of Six Hundred ($600) Dollars (R. 292, 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, page 12). 
Defendant's argument that the trial court made a mathematical error is simply contrary 
to the trial court's calculations as set forth in the trial court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. Pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code, Plaintiff was entitled to 
a return of the money that he paid to the Defendants ($5,900) + the fair market value of the 
generator and switching equipment ($38,000) + his incidental damages ($2,500) for a total 
of Forty-Six Thousand Four Hundred ($46,400) Dollars, to which was added the 
prejudgment interest of $13,533, and Plaintiffs costs in the amount of $600 for a total 
judgment of Sixty Thousand Five Hundred Thirty-Three ($60,533) Dollars. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST ON THE PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES 
Defendants argue that the trial court erred in awarding prejudgement interest because 
Plaintiffs experts varied in their opinion as to the value of the generator and electrical equipment, and 
the Court therefore had to make a judgment call on the damages that were not fixed at the time of 
the breach An examination of the facts indicate that Defendant's position is not well-taken 
Richard Mitchell, an electrician, testified that the electrical switching equipment had a value 
of Six to Eight Thousand ($6,000 to $8,000) Dollars; and the trial court found that the value of the 
switching equipment was Eight Thousand ($8,000) Dollars. 
Additionally, Richard Mitchell opined that the value of the generator was between Twenty-
Three and Twenty-Four Thousand ($23,000 to $24,000) Dollars. 
Jim Yates, an equipment dealer, who had been engaged in the business of selling equipment 
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for approximately 30 years, testified that the market value of the generator was between Twenty-Five 
and Thirty-Five Thousand ($25,000 to $35,000) Dollars. Jim Yates gave no opinion as to the value 
of the switching equipment. Based upon combined testimonies of Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Yates, the 
trial court found the value of the generator to be Thirty Thousand ($30,000) Dollars, and the 
switching equipment to have a value of Eight Thousand ($8,000) Dollars. It should also be noted that 
Mr. Jonsson, after consulting several dealers, advised Defendants at the time of the breach that it 
would cost between Thirty-Six ($36,000) and Forty-Six Thousand ($46,000) Dollars to replace the 
generator and switching equipment (R. 353 at p. 150). 
Prejudgment interest should be awarded when the damages can be ascertained by "fixed rules 
of evidence and known standards of value, " Fell v Union Pac. Ry Co.. 88 P. 1003 (Utah 1907) In 
accordance with this standard and based upon a narrow range of properly presented market value 
evidence, the trial court found the value of the generator and switching equipment to be Thirty-Eight 
Thousand ($38,000) Dollars, and Plaintiffs consequential damages to be Twenty-Five Hundred 
($2,500) Dollars, and applying U.C.A. §§ 70A-2-711, 713, awarded a total judgment of Forty-Six 
Thousand Four Hundred ($46,400) Dollars, plus prejudgment interest from November 1996, through 
the date of judgment ($13,533). It is critical to note at trial, Defendants did not put on any testimony 
as to the value of the generator and switching equipment; and therefore failed to present any evidence 
requiring the trial court to exercise its discretion, as between the parties, in determining damages 
Apparently, Defendants were content to have Mr Yates testify as to value because as Mr Yates 
testified, he was "friends" with both parties which made it difficult for him to testify (R. 353 at p 
122:14-25). 
Defendants argue that it is appropriate to deny prejudgment interest if the amount of the 
8 
damages are not known at the time of the breach, because the breaching party cannot tender the 
amount the amount owed. That is not the situation in this case. The trail court found that Defendant 
Reed Bromley had wrongfully sold the generator and switching equipment to a third party having 
previously misrepresented to Plaintiff Keith Jonsson, that the equipment purchased by Plaintiff was 
being serviced in Salt Lake City (R. 272, Memorandum Decision). Upon Defendant Reed Bromley 
admitting that he had wrongfully sold the equipment, he told Plaintiff Keith Jonsson to find a 
comparable generator, and that he would replace the generator and switching equipment that he had 
wrongfully sold. Based upon this representation, Mr. Jonsson verified with several dealers, that the 
generator and switching equipment had a value of between Thirty-Six Thousand ($36,000) and 
Forty-Six Thousand ($46,000) Dollars, which information, Mr. Jonsson relayed to Mr. Bromley 
Accordingly, contrary to Defendant's position, that he did not know how much to tender to Plaintiff 
Keith Jonsson, the evidence is clear that in November of 1996, Defendant was very much aware of 
the fact that the damages were approximately Forty-Six Thousand ($46,000) Dollars, which is very 
close to the principal judgment of $46,400 that the trial court awarded Plaintiff. 
In footnote 2 of Appellant's Brief (quoting from Castillo v. Atlanta Cas. Co.. 939 P 2d 1204 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997), Appellant states: 
This Court will add prejudgment interest to a trial court's judgment 
only when the market value of the loss is clearly determined by the 
testimony of an expert witness, not the discretionary judgment of the 
trial judge. Castillo. 939 P. 2d at 1206. The decision in Castillo 
furthers the policy of compensating the injured party for a delay in 
payment that could be measured by facts and figures before trial. The 
decision lies in contrast to the case at hand, where the trial judge 
chose to weigh the opinions of others and then apply his own best 
judgment in determining the market value of the loss. Thus, Mr. 
Bromley could not have known before trial what amount he owed 
after his breach, and should not be punished for not paying when the 
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amount was not ascertainable or calculable (Appellant's Brief, Page 
12) 
Defendant's assertion as set forth above, that he did not know the amount of the damages is 
contrary to the evidence which establishes that Defendant Reed Bromley knew the amount of the 
damages as early as November 1996 
This Court in Castillo v Atlanta Cas Co . 939 P 2d 1204 at 1212 (Utah App 1997), 
referenced above, stated 
In Utah, prejudgment interest "represents an amount awarded as 
damages due to the opposing party's delay in tendering the amount 
owing under an obligation " L &A Drywall, Inc .v. Whitmore Constr. 
Co., 608 P2d 626, 629 (Utah 1980) Accord Hermes Assocs. v. 
Park's Sportsman, 813 P 2d 1221, 1224 (Utah Ct App 1991), Vase Is 
v. LoGiudice, 740 P 2d 1375, 1378 (Utah Ct App 1987), 22 
Am Jur 2d Damages § 82 (1988) See also Trail Mountain Coal Co. 
v. UtahDiv. of State Lands & Forestry, 921 P 2d 1365, 1370 (Utah 
1996) (stating that, as matter of public policy, prejudgment interest 
compensates party for depreciating value of amount owed and deters 
intentional withholding of money owed), cert, denied, — U S , 
117 S Ct 1017, 136 L Ed 2d 894 (1997) It may be awarded where 
"damage is complete, the loss can be measured by facts and figures, 
and the amount of loss is fixed as of a particular time " Andreason v. 
Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., 848 P 2d 171, 177 (Utah Ct App 1993) 
In November of 1996, Defendant Reed Bromley knew that Plaintiff Keith Jonsson's damages 
were between Thirty-Six ($36,000) and Forty-Six ($46,000) Thousand Dollars, after Mr Jonsson had 
determined the value of the generator and switching equipment that Mr Bromley had agreed to 
replace 
Defendant Bromley chose to breach the contract and wrongfully sell equipment previously 
sold to Plaintiff Jonsson in order farther Defendant Bromley's own economic interests Mr Bromley 
needed the money that he received from selling the equipment to a third party to preserve an asset 
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that was subsequently sold for 2.2 Million Dollars. In accordance with the policy set forth in Castillo. 
"as a matter of public policy, prejudgment interest compensates party for depreciating value of 
amount owed and deters intentional withholding of money owed" (Castillo at page 1212). 
The narrow range of testimony from which the trial court determined the value of the 
generator and electrical equipment was very close to what Plaintiff Keith Jonsson had advised 
Defendant Reed Bromley were his damages, as early as November 1996, both of which values were 
based on market values. 
Under the facts of this case, Defendants should not be rewarded for intentionally withholding 
money from Plaintiff and Plaintiff should not be further damaged for the depreciating amount owed 
him, because Plaintiffs experts testified to a slight variation in market value. 
Accordingly, the trial court under the facts of this case and in accordance with the policy 
considerations set forth in Castillo, properly awarded Plaintiff Keith Jonsson prejudgment interest to 
compensate him for the depreciating value of the amount owed, and avoided benefiting Defendants 
for "intentionally withholding of money owed." 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly applied its findings in accordance with U.C.A. §§ 70A-2-711 
through 715, in determining Plaintiffs damages. 
The trial court correctly awarded prejudgment interest under the facts of this case, and 
the Judgment in the amount of Sixty Thousand, Five Hundred, Thirty-Three ($60,533) 
Dollars, should be affirmed. 
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DATED this / / day of October, 2000. 
PERKINS, SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN 
MARK C. MCLACHLAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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